KYE MCP Server · integration surface, not enforcement surface

Make KYE available to MCP-compatible agents — safely.

The KYE MCP Server exposes KYE Protocol schemas, dictionaries, authority checks, Decision Maps, and evidence packs through a controlled Model Context Protocol interface. Read-only resources, decision tools, and gated admin tools — with full auth, idempotency, and audit binding.

The boundary

MCP is for integration. Production enforcement stays in the gateway.

smart_toyKYE MCP ServerIntegration surface for agents, IDEs, AI assistants, and developer tools. Read-only by default; decision and admin tools require explicit gating.
architectureKYE Runtime GatewayThe enforcement surface. Production decisions for agent actions, payment authorisations, and capability invocations land here — never on MCP alone.

An MCP tool call should not bypass the runtime gateway for any production-affecting action. The MCP server's decision tools call through the gateway, log the call as an audit event, and return the gateway's signed response. Treat MCP as a typed, controlled query and proposal layer.

Read-only tools

10 tools, no side effects.

Read-only tools never mutate state, never publish events, never affect production. They are safe to enable for any MCP client.

  • kye.resolve_entity — resolve an entity URN to its canonical record
  • kye.get_entity_state — current six-dimensional state vector
  • kye.get_authority_grant — lookup a grant by id
  • kye.get_delegation_chain — walk the chain from actor to root principal
  • kye.get_capability_manifest — manifest for a named capability
  • kye.get_decision_map — signed Decision Map for a decision id
  • kye.get_evidence_pack — signed evidence pack by id
  • kye.verify_evidence_pack — verify a pack offline using the published JWKS
  • kye.list_reason_codes — full reason-code dictionary
  • kye.explain_decision — human-readable rendering of a Decision Map
Decision tools

5 tools, gated to the runtime gateway.

Decision tools propose an action and ask the runtime gateway for a verdict. They never decide locally; the gateway decides, signs, and audits.

  • kye.decide_authority — ask "may this actor exercise this authority right now?"
  • kye.decide_capability_invocation — ask "may this capability be invoked with these parameters?"
  • kye.check_payment_authority — ask "is this delegated payment authority valid for this transaction?"
  • kye.check_agent_purchase — ask "may this agent buy this basket from this merchant on this instrument?"
  • kye.check_scope — ask "does this action fit inside the named scope?"

Every decision tool returns the standard decision codes (allow / allow_with_constraints / require_approval / require_step_up / require_human_review / require_recovery / quarantine / deny) plus a Decision Map reference. The MCP client cannot bypass the gateway.

Admin / write tools · gated by default

8 tools that mutate state — all gated.

Admin tools are off by default. When enabled, every call MUST present tenant authentication, MUST pass policy checks, MUST carry an idempotency key, MUST emit an audit event, and MAY require step-up approval depending on the policy binding. Treat MCP write paths as a high-risk surface.

  • kye.create_entity — create a new entity record
  • kye.create_delegation — create a delegation between actor and principal
  • kye.grant_authority — grant scoped authority to a delegation
  • kye.revoke_authority — revoke an authority grant
  • kye.quarantine_entity — quarantine an entity (state mutation)
  • kye.rotate_credential — rotate signing credentials for an entity
  • kye.create_capability_manifest — register a new capability manifest
  • kye.create_webhook_endpoint — register a new subscriber endpoint

Hard requirements per call: tenant auth (mTLS or OAuth2 client-credentials) · per-tool capability check via the runtime gateway · idempotency key in the request · reason code in the request · full audit event emitted before response · step-up approval per policy binding.

MCP resources

Schemas, dictionaries, profiles, decisions, evidence.

MCP resources are URI-addressable, read-only data exposed to the client. The KYE MCP Server exposes a uniform kye:// URI scheme.

  • kye://schemas/core · kye://schemas/entity · kye://schemas/authority-grant · kye://schemas/capability-manifest
  • kye://dictionaries/reason-codes · kye://dictionaries/decision-codes · kye://dictionaries/event-types
  • kye://profiles/payment-authority · kye://profiles/agent-purchasing · kye://profiles/{profile-id}
  • kye://decision-maps/{id} · kye://evidence-packs/{id}
  • kye://entities/{id} · kye://capabilities/{id} · kye://delegations/{id}
MCP prompts

Reusable prompt templates clients can discover.

  • review_authority_chain — structured review of a delegation chain for attenuation correctness
  • explain_decision_map — render a Decision Map in natural language for a non-technical audience
  • draft_authority_grant — help an operator draft a scoped authority-grant request
  • model_agent_purchasing_flow — sketch an agent-purchasing flow against the kye-payments-card profile
  • generate_open_banking_authority_map — map a TPP → agent → ASPSP Authority Graph
  • assess_kye_readiness — readiness review against the 12-question Authority Finality assessment
  • prepare_evidence_pack_summary — one-page summary of an evidence pack for a regulator-facing brief
Security

MCP tool-use is a high-risk surface.

MCP server deployments have introduced real-world risks: malicious tool execution, credential theft, prompt-injection-driven privilege escalation, and supply-chain compromise via untrusted server packages. The KYE MCP Server assumes the worst by default.

  • Tenant-scoped auth — every connection requires mTLS or OAuth2 client-credentials. No anonymous access.
  • Per-tool allowlisting — tools are off by default. Operators explicitly enable read-only / decision / admin sets per tenant.
  • Policy-bound writes — admin tools route through the runtime gateway's policy decision point; the MCP server cannot decide locally.
  • Idempotency required — admin tools require an idempotency key; replays return the original response.
  • Audit-bound — every MCP call (resource fetch, tool invocation, prompt expansion) emits an audit event with the actor entity id, the tool name, the request hash, and the response hash.
  • Signed responses — decision tool responses carry the gateway's signature so the MCP client can verify the answer didn't come from the MCP server itself.
  • Rate-limited — per-tenant, per-tool budgets. Burst protection on admin tools.
  • Supply-chain — reference server distributed via signed releases; SBOM published; reproducible builds.
Start

Run the reference server in 5 minutes.

  1. Install — npm i @kye-protocol/mcp-server
  2. Configure tenant auth, gateway URL, and the tool allowlist (read-only / decision / admin sets).
  3. Start the server — npx kye-mcp-server --config kye-mcp.json
  4. Connect from an MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, internal AI platform). Discover resources, tools, and prompts.
  5. Verify with the included conformance suite — npx kye-mcp-server conformance
Adjacent reading

Where to go next.